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Available online xxxxIn urban centres of Mozambique, charcoal is the major energy source for cooking. Growing demand drives high
wood extraction rates over increasing areas of miombo andmopanewoodlands. Charcoal production can lead to
changes in ecosystem service provision and woodland degradation while also signiﬁcantly contributing to rural
income and, possibly, poverty alleviation. As such, understanding charcoal production and trade has important
implications for rural areas and for the sustainable development of woodland resources. Here, we investigate
charcoal production and trade through empirical research conducted in Gaza Province, themain charcoal supply
area for Maputo, Mozambique.
We analyse the present structure of themain charcoal supply chains fromGazaprovince toMaputo and the proﬁt
distribution along them. Seven villages in theMabalane district, Gaza, at different stages of engagement with the
charcoal industry, were selected for investigation. We conducted household surveys and semi-structured inter-
views with key informants (village leaders, charcoal producers, licence holders, wholesalers, transporters and
forest technicians), from May to October 2014.
Our results highlight two main charcoal supply chains comprising four main actor groups a) Local small-scale
operators producing charcoal on a small-scale with household labour, who sell to wholesalers b) Large-scale op-
erators producing and commercialising large volumes of charcoal using migrant labour, who sell their own pro-
duction to wholesalers. While charcoal production constitutes an important income source for rural households
inMabalane, under supply chain a) more than 90% of the monetary beneﬁts do not reach local communities and
remainwith external agents. Two of themain factors impeding the generation of greater revenues at community
level are: 1) bureaucratic burdens in obtaining charcoal commercialisation rights in the form of licences; and
2) weak institutional capacities for woodland resource governance.
We conclude that access tomarkets and control overwoodlands is key if local communities are to generate great-
er beneﬁts fromcharcoal productionwhile aiming at sustainable charcoal production. Strong local institutions for
obtaining commercialisation rights and managing woodland resources have to be developed, while the
restructuring of the licencing system in favour of small-scale producers and more rigorous control of the regula-
tions could support this process.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of International Energy Initiative. This is an open access








Charcoal is one of the major sources of energy inmost African coun-
tries; about 90% of urban households depend on charcoal for cooking
and heating (Schure et al., 2013; Zulu and Richardson, 2013; World
Bank, 2011). Growing demand for charcoal, due to population growth
and urbanisation, has led to increasedwood extraction rates, particular-
ly around urban centres (Ahrends et al., 2010) and contributes to
expanding wood extraction in the woodland areas inhabited by ruralvier Inc. on behalf of Internatiopopulations. Where this exceeds regrowth rates, forest or woodland
degradation occurs (Cuvilas et al., 2010).
Currently, millions of rural and urban people worldwide derive part
of their livelihood from the charcoal value chain (Zulu and Richardson,
2013; Macqueen and Korhaliller, 2011; World Bank, 2011). Quasi
open access to woodland resources, low investment requirements and
low labour opportunity costs due to a lack of alternative income-
generating activities and low agricultural productivity make charcoal
production a proﬁtable activity for the rural population (Zulu and
Richardson, 2013; NL Agency, 2010; Kambewa et al., 2007; SEI, 2002;
Luoga et al., 2000). Managed sustainably as a renewable resource, char-
coal production could serve as a long-term income source for the poornal Energy Initiative. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
1 MZN Mozambique New Metical: 1 USD = 32.8 http://www.oanda.com/currency/
converter/ (last access: 01/13/2015)
2 Originally 1 stere qualiﬁes 1 m3 of stacked dry ﬁrewood. Related to charcoal, 1 stere per-
mits the production of one sack of charcoal which was originally meant to have a weight of
50 kg (SPFFB). In the study area, however, charcoal sacks are traded with a weight of 70–
90 kg (Atanassov et al., 2012).
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tural off-season and improve well-being (Schure et al., 2014b; Zulu and
Richardson, 2013; Arnold et al., 2006; Angelsen and Wunder, 2003).
Several studies have investigated charcoal supply chains and their po-
litical economies (Minten et al., 2013; van Beukering et al., 2007;
Kambewa et al., 2007; Brouwer andMagane, 1999; Ribot, 1998) showing
highly informal institutional arrangements. Typically, and especially in
larger urban areas (Zulu and Richardson, 2013), a small number of verti-
cally integrated operators (i.e., participating in several levels of the value
chain) capture most of the proﬁts. Low competition due to high barriers
of entry, collection of proﬁtmargins atmore than one level and high turn-
over rates lead to high proﬁt accumulation for these integrated actors
(Shively et al., 2010; Zulu, 2010; Puna, 2008; Boberg, 1993). In contrast,
local community producers are seldom organised into groupings such
as associations, have little bargaining power and are usually not integrat-
ed beyond the production level (Zulu and Richardson, 2013; Shively et al.,
2010; Puna, 2008; van Beukering et al., 2007).
InMozambique a few studies analysed the beneﬁt distribution along
the Maputo charcoal supply chain and showed substantial beneﬁt gen-
eration at the local level. Chavana (2014) concluded that charcoal pro-
ducing community members can create highest beneﬁts among all
groups involved in the value chain due to their low production costs.
Also van der Plas et al. (2012) calculated that 53% of total charcoal in-
come goes to producers (and 9% to transporters, 17% wholesalers and
21% to retailers) and concluded that a considerable share of the charcoal
beneﬁts remain in rural areas. Likewise, Brouwer and Magane (1999)
estimated that considerable revenues beneﬁt rural areas. However,
none of the studies distinguished variability between producers
e.g., between local village producers and migrant full-time workers
whoare contracted by large-scale urban operators and are notmembers
of the local community, a common phenomenon in Southern
Mozambique (Atanassov and Mahumane, 2012; Puna, 2008). Commu-
nities may not in fact receive any beneﬁt either due to unlicensed
wood harvesting by the urban operators or due to weak enforcement
of beneﬁt sharingmechanisms (i.e., payment of 20% licence fee to com-
munities). In this case, research suggests that most money generated
does not beneﬁt the rural population but remains with a few external
actors (World Bank, 2009; Puna, 2008; Boberg, 1993). In Mozambique
it remains unclear how much of the total value generated through
charcoal production is retained at the community level. Moreover, in-
consistent use of calculation methods, data sources and terminology
(e.g. margin, proﬁt, revenue, mark-up) makes it difﬁcult to compare
different studies and come to sound conclusions.
We propose that there are at least three major reasons why policy-
makers might want to intervene in this commodity chain to promote
the interests of community-level producers. The ﬁrst reason is for
rural poverty reduction. The government of Mozambique is attempting
to reduce poverty through the new ﬁve year plan (PQG 2014-2019)
(GoM, 2015), which places emphasis on community governance of nat-
ural resources to reduce poverty (Priority V of the PQG). This is linked to
the second rationale, which is about the government attempting to fos-
ter inclusive growth. A shift towards a charcoal commodity chain more
in the interests of community-level producers would promote more
local employment opportunities (Priority III of the PQG), and expand
the local economy. The third reason for governance of the charcoal com-
modity chain in the interests of community-level producers is as part of
efforts to promote environmental sustainability, and to ride on the coat
tails of current areas of international policy concern such as land use
emissions of greenhouse gases (Schure et al., 2014a).
We ﬁrst present an overview of the legal framework inMozambique
and elaborate the approaches andmethods used in our research. The re-
sult section starts by describing the charcoal production trends in the
observed villages. Then a vertical analysis examines the structure of
the charcoal value chain from rural production to urban marketing
and the role that the different actors play within it. This enables us to
understand who participates at what stage and how. Next, an analysisof how the legal framework operates in the study area provides insights
on its consequences on villagers and on the alternatives they have in the
future. Last, we present the proﬁts obtained by each group and its distri-
bution along the value chain. This helps in differentiating between
groups and their ability to derive beneﬁts from the woodland.
In our discussion, we interpret our results through the lens of the
access approach of Ribot (1998), and examine how the different actors
are gaining, controlling and maintaining their access (Ribot and Peluso,
2003) to the value chain. This is critical, as it enables an understanding
of how governance can be shaped in favour of communities. In light of
our results, we then examine the operationalisation of the Forest and
Wildlife law (GoM, 1999) on the ground. Our work is particularly
timely, as it can inform the implementation of the 2013 Strategy for
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biomass Energy (GoM, 2013)
aiming at joint interventionswith the government agencies responsible
for renewable energy, forests and rural development.Policy and legal framework in Mozambique for charcoal production
Forests andwoodlands inMozambique fall under the responsibility of
the Ministry of Land, Environment and Rural Development (MITADER).
The Forest andWildlife Law (GoM, 1999) sets the legal basis for sustain-
able use of forest andwildlife resources. Forest resources are the property
of the state, with local communities being allowed to exploit forest re-
sources for their own consumption. Any commercial exploitation needs
authorization through a licence which is available to national operators
and local communities (GoM, 1999). To apply for ‘simple licences’, a for-
est management plan (plano de maneio) must be prepared, which docu-
ments the species abundance and the quantity and duration of resource
extraction in a deﬁned area. If the applicant is a non-resident of the com-
munity where charcoal production is planned, he/shemust conduct local
consultations (GoM, 2002, Decree no. 12/2002): Exploitation of the
community woodlands or forest resources and a contribution to the re-
spective village has to be negotiated between the community resource
management committee and the applicant. Following consensus, the re-
cord of consultation (acta da consulta) has to be read out loudly and
signed by at least 10 people representing the committee (GoM, 2002, De-
cree no. 12/2002). Eventually, the decision needs to be approved by the
district administrator. Following this, an area of maximum 500 ha can
be ofﬁcially designated as a charcoal production site and registered in
the land registry. At district level it has to be conﬁrmed that the designat-
ed area has sufﬁcient resources for the proposed extraction volume and
that the land has not been allocated to other users (GoM, 2002, Decree
no. 12/2002).
With the provision of the required documents, a contract for forest
or woodland exploitation (contrato de exploração) for a period of ﬁve
years can be signed between the applicant and the provincial governor.
Following, the SPFFB (Provincial Services for Forest andWildlife) grants
a simple licence and a fee of 75 MZN1 per stere2 has to be paid by the
applicant. In 2012, modiﬁcations were made to the Forest Law (GoM,
2012, Decree no. 30/2012) limiting the charcoal production to
1000 steres per year and licence and restricting the maximum individ-
ual exploitation area to 500 ha to outsider operators and 1000 ha to
local people. The guia de trânsito — a record book that comes with the
licence has to be carried along with the charcoal transporting trucks —
is the main monitoring instrument for the Forestry Department. It doc-
uments the quantity of charcoal licenced, harvested and transported
(GoM, 2002, Decree no. 12/2002). The law enforcement ofﬁcers check
(at several points along the main routes) the ﬂow of charcoal against
131S. Baumert et al. / Energy for Sustainable Development 33 (2016) 129–138the licence and the guia in order to detect any illegal charcoal trans-
porting (e.g., transporting more charcoal than licenced, transporting
charcoal from other exploitation areas than allowed, operating without
licence) (GoM, 2002, Decree no. 12/2002). According to the Forest Law,
local communities shall receive 20% of the licence fees and 50% of the
value of ﬁnes paid for Forest Law violation are supposed to be
channelled back to the local communities and law enforcement ofﬁcers
(GoM, 2002, Decree no. 12/2002).
The policy and legal framework also establishes the concept of
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) as key to
achieving the social objective of the Forest andWildlife Policy. Through
local resource management committees (Conselhos Locais de Gestão de
Recursos Florestais), community members should be empowered to
protect their interests, to acquire licences for forest or woodland re-
source commercialisation, to beneﬁt from 20% of the licence fees applied
on forest and wildlife products and to ensure local law enforcement.
Nevertheless, the implementation of the legal framework remains chal-
lenging as rules and regulations can easily be undermined (Nhancale
et al., 2009; van der Plas et al., 2012) leading to high levels of informal
charcoal production (Zulu and Richardson, 2013; Cuvilas et al., 2010;
del Gatto, 2003; SEI, 2002).Study area
The present study is part of the interdisciplinary ACES (Abrupt
Changes in Ecosystem Services and Wellbeing in Mozambican
Woodlands) project, which aims to understand how woodland loss
and degradation is changing ecosystem services and wellbeing of the
rural poor in Mozambique. The role of charcoal, as one of the most
pertinent provisioning services, was highlighted during a national
stakeholder workshop held in Maputo (Nhantumbo et al., 2015).
Gaza province is currently the main charcoal production area sup-
plying Maputo-city (Falcão, 2013; Atanassov et al., 2012) holding the
highest number of charcoal licences throughout the country in the last
decade (Luz et al., 2015). Within Gaza charcoal production constantly
moves to new areas of mopane woodland (Colophospermum mopane)
with increasing distance to Maputo. Mabalane district has the highest
licenced charcoal production (Luz et al., 2015). Given its location as a
charcoal production hotspot, our empirical work at the production
level was conducted in Mabalane district, Gaza province (Fig. 1).
The district has an area of 9000 km2 with a population density of
3.6 persons km−2 (INE, 2008). Mabalane district overlaps partially
with both National Parks of Limpopo and Banhine, where charcoalFig. 1. Land cover and selected villages in Mabalane, Mozambique. While the land cover and bo
villages investigated, the villages are represented by letters, and their location ﬁctitious.production is not licenced. Mabalane has a semi-arid climate (mean an-
nual precipitation 500 mm with high inter-annual variations (GoM,
2005)) and a forest/woodland cover greater than 80% (own mapping),
mainly consisting ofMopanewoodlands.Mopane is oneof the preferred
indigenous hardwood species for charcoal production, as the dense
wood produces slow-burning charcoal (Falcão, 2013). However, under
dry conditions mopane trees have very low growth rates ranging from
approx. 1.2–2.1 mm yr−1 (Bila and Mabjaia, 2012; Wessels, 2002).
Charcoal production and commercialisation is one of the main econom-
ic activities in the district, along with low intensity rain-fed agriculture
and animal husbandry under communal grazing systems (Levy and
Kaufman, 2014).Research design and methods
The village selection for the overall ACES project was guided by a
woodland degradation gradient ranging from villages with more intact
woodland areas to those with degraded woodland, with more intact
woodlands showing no signs of widespread harvesting of trees other
than for domestic use. Seven villages at different stages of the gradient
were selected having similar soils, rainfall, and vegetation types. For
the present study this translated into a charcoal production gradient,
from villages without charcoal production, to those experiencing a
charcoal production peak, and to villages where the peak has already
passed. Accordingly, the selected villages were classiﬁed in pre-boom,
boom and post-boom following the criteria: 1) present number of
licence holders in the community land, 2) production quantity of
licenced charcoal and 3) yearwith highest charcoal production according
to village narratives (Table 2).
To explore the charcoal production and trade in southern
Mozambique, a commodity-chain analysis was applied, a tool to under-
stand who beneﬁts from the woodland resources at what stage, and
using what means (formal institutions, local capacities, etc.). Details of
the approach can be found in Bolwig et al. (2008) and Ribot (1998). A
vertical analysis served to identify and characterise the existing charcoal
supply models from rural production to urban marketing and the role
that different actors play within it. The vertical analysis also allowed
for the examination of the coherence between actors' behaviours and
the legal framework.
Proﬁt distribution along the charcoal supply chain was examined by
analysing price margins, expenses and quantities handled by the differ-
ent actors involved in the charcoal supply chain (underlying data and
calculations in the supplementary information, SI 1 and SI 2). Marginsundaries of the district are accurately represented here, to maintain the anonymity of the
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penses. The net income generation was calculated by multiplying the
margins per sack with the monthly volume of charcoal produced
and/or traded.
It is worth noting, however, that we do not focus on the retailer
commercialising charcoal within the urban areas but rather concentrate
on the production side in order to disentangle the community beneﬁts.
A deeper understanding about urbanmarketing activities can be gained
in Atanassov et al. (2012). Further, the transporters offering the service
of charcoal transportation to the wholesalers are considered as exoge-
nous actors, only appearing as a cost for the other actors participating
in charcoal trading.
Data collection
Between May and October 2014, research was undertaken in the
selected villages to collect quantitative and qualitative social data. For
this paper relevant methods included: a) semi-structured interviews
with the village leaders covering village characteristics, main livelihood
activities and woodland resources, b) participatory mapping exercises
helping to understand the village structure and land-use patterns,
c) focus group discussions (FGD) with charcoal producers and d) semi-
structured interviews with charcoal associations or village committee
members (detailed in Table 1). Moreover, charcoal production camps
were visited and workers were interviewed. The interviews and FGD
with the charcoal producers covered charcoal production history, pro-
duction processes, woodland access and distribution, licencing and con-
trol mechanisms, institutional arrangements, marketing processes and
prices. Further information about the participation of the households in
the charcoal production was gained through a household survey, which
was run in the selected villages coveringmore than 80% of all households
following randomised sampling (Table 1).
Transportation and licencing schemes of charcoal were investigated
through interviews with truck drivers transporting charcoal from
Mabalane to Maputo, and with forestry technicians from the District
Services of Economic Affairs (SDAE) located in Mabalane-Sede and
Combomune-Estação. Licence documentation (2009–2014) and infor-
mation on the ofﬁcial licence regulation were gathered during a visit
to the Provincial Services for Forest and Wildlife (SPFFB) in Xai-Xai.
The use ofmultiplemethodologies allowed the triangulation ofﬁndings.
Statistical analyses
Descriptive statistics were used to illustrate the main characteristics
of charcoal producing areas and their producers. Statistical analyses
(ANOVA) and Bonferroni corrected posthoc-test were conducted for
the identiﬁcation of statistically signiﬁcant differences between groups
at the 0.05 level.Mean values± standard error are given if not indicated
otherwise. Standard errorswere adjusted for nested design (householdsTable 1
Research sites, methodologies applied and sample size.
Villages
Sampling method A B C
Participatory mapping X X X
FGD with charcoal producers X X X
Interviews (n) Leader 1 1 1
Committee member 1 – 1
Association member 2 – –
Charcoal camp 3 2 3
HH survey







FGD: focus group discussion; A committee member is most of the time also “ﬁscal ﬂorestal com
a Technicians from the SDAE Mabalane.
b Truck driver.nested in villages) through robust cluster estimation. Household and
licence data were analysed using STATA (13.0). Qualitative data were
analysed on a thematic basis, and offer thick descriptions of causal
processes relating to the quantitative trends observed.
Results
Villages along the charcoal production gradient
After the civil war ended in 1992, most villagers returned from
Mabalane-Sede and Combomune-Estação to their home villages. During
these years, small-scale charcoal production and local commercialisation
was an important activity in order to overcome years of very low agricul-
tural productivity due to dry spells and the need for re-initiation of
agriculture.With increasing demand for charcoal inMaputo-city and de-
creasing woodland cover around Maputo, Mabalane has become one of
the major charcoal supply areas with large-scale charcoal production
and commercialisation mainly driven by urban-based operators holding
a licence.
The ﬁrst villages targeted by large-scale charcoal production were
located in the southern zone of Mabalane (village A, B and C) with
good access roads and dense mopane woodlands. Within the study,
these villages are classiﬁed as post-boom villages as they have passed
the charcoal production peak between 2006 and 2009. During these
years charcoal production was driven by large-scale operators bringing
licences, trucks, chainsaws and workers. With decreasing woodland
cover and fewer large mopane trees, in 2009 the large-scale operators
started to withdraw from the areas of village A and B and moved on to
new exploitation zones further north. Licence data show that only 1–3
licence holders for the period from 2009 to 2014 remain in the southern
areas (Table 2). In village C, the charcoal boom stopped in 2013when all
large-scale operators withdrew from the area and the licenced charcoal
volume dropped from 29,335 to 1590 sacks per year (decrease from 22
to 2 licence holders). In the year that ﬁeldwork for this studywas under-
taken (2014), charcoal production by large-scale operators was at its
minimumand the remaining treeswere used for small-scale production
by villagers. Villagers stated that production had becomemore difﬁcult
as they had to walk long distances to ﬁnd sufﬁcient sized trees
(ref FGD). The charcoal was sold to occasionally passing trucks or in
small quantities on the weekly market in Mabalane.
In boom villages considered (village D and E) production driven by
large-scale operators started in 2011 and peaked in 2013 (Table 2). In
year 2014, charcoal production was still at a very high level but as
woodland resources were exhausted the number of large-scale opera-
tors also decreased. However, villagers said that they still have enough
resources to continue production for several years. In village E, charcoal
production did not occur to the same extent as in other villages.
According to the interviews, this village consciously has refrained
from becoming a key production area as they realised early that theD E F G Combomune-Estação/
Mabalane-Sede
X X X – –
X X X X x
1 1 1 1 –
1 1 – 1 2a
– 1 – 1 –












Investigated villages along the charcoal production gradient and their main characteristics.
Post-boom Boom Pre-boom
Village A B C D E F G
“Boom year” 2006 2009 2007 2011 2013 – –
Licence holders (n) 0 1 2 66 20 0 0
Vol. licenced (sacks yr−1) 0 730 1000 47,139 13,777 0 0
HH (N(n)) 38 (35) 29 (25) 63 (51) 42 (36) 58 (42) 55 (48) 27 (24)
HH producing charcoal (%) 88 ± 0.6a 92 ± 0.6a 92 ± 0.4a n.o. 64 ± 0.7b 89 ± 0.4a 0
HH charcoal production (sacks HH−1 yr−1) 150 ± 20 90 ± 11 130 ± 24 n.o. 168 ± 36 95 ± 20 0 nsd
Village charcoal production (sacks yr−1) 5016 2401 7535 n.o. 6236 4650 0
Different letters indicated signiﬁcant differences between the villages. Mean value ± standard error. Signiﬁcance level at b 0.05. Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparison. n: sample size.
nsd: no signiﬁcant difference. n.o.: no observation. All data refer to year 2014.
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and do not bring great beneﬁts to the village. Thus, the village committee
restricted the number of large-scale operators in 2013, in order to pre-
serve the remainingwoodland resources for their own charcoal produc-
tion and commercialisation (ref FGD). A village association supports
local producers in commercialising their charcoal and informs them
about the disadvantages when selling their charcoal to wholesalers
with licences from other exploitation areas. The association invested in
buying and maintaining a motor-driven water pump and has plans to
build a borehole for livestock.
Two villages (F and G) were considered as pre-boom areas either
because the production has not yet started or did not yet reach the
levels as in the other investigated areas. In the latter case, difﬁcult access
was one of the main reasons why no large-scale operators came to the
village. Villagers expressed their interest in producing charcoal if
large-scale operators were to come, however, according to the inter-
views theywould not allow the large-scale production as they observed
in the other villages. In village F, an NGO project (1998–2012)
implementing sustainablewoodlandmanagement restricted thewood-
land resource exploitation to manual small-scale charcoal production
(Brouwer, 2008). With the termination of the NGO project, people
started to use chainsaws, but the majority of the population is cutting
trees manually, which limits the production of large quantities
(Table 2). According to them, with sufﬁcient agricultural production
they would refrain from charcoal production, however the main limit-
ing factor is access to water.Fig. 2. Charcoal value chains identiﬁed in Mabalane district and peStudying villages along a charcoal production gradient showed that
the relative number of households involved in charcoal production
and their amount of charcoal production does not change signiﬁcantly,
except for village E, where fewer households are producing large quan-
tities (Table 2). The overall charcoal production gradient appears to be
driven by large-scale operators depending on the availability and acces-
sibility of thewoodland resource, village-level charcoal production rules
and the inﬂuence of third-parties (NGOS) with conservation objectives.
Vertical analysis of the supply chains
We identiﬁed two main charcoal supply chains comprising four
main actor groups: 1) Local village operators producing charcoal on a
small-scale with household labour and sales to wholesalers, and
2) Large-scale operators producing and commercialising charcoal on a
large-scale using migrant labour who are selling their own production
to wholesalers (Fig. 2).
Unlicensed small-scale local village production with sales to wholesalers
The ﬁrst supply chain involves local households without licences
selling mainly to urban wholesalers (who transport and sell charcoal
to retailers in Maputo-city). At the village level, 76% (n = 223) of the
households produce charcoal with 16% of them being female headed.
More than 78% (of those producing charcoal) have increased their pro-
ductionwith chainsaws and/or byhiring temporary labour and 22%pro-
duce charcoal on a small scale relying on manual household labourrcentage of production volume (for seven observed villages).
Table 4
Main characteristics of the large-scale operator model.
Characteristic Mean ± SD
Provenance of licence holders (156 in year 2014) Mabalane district centres: 19%
Maputo/Matola: 50%
Other urban areas: 31%
Area distributed to each licence holder (ha) 359 ± 169
Annual licenced charcoal per licence holder
(2013) (sacks)
829 ± 245
Contribution to village (MZN yr−1) 25,000–30,000
Workers per camp 7 ± 4
Origin of workers Inhambane district: 83%
Size of kiln (sacks) 40 ± 14
Kilns produced per month and worker 1
Payment of workers 30–40% share of production
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however, production is unequally distributed across the population
with only 55 out of the 160 producers (34%) producing above the aver-
age, accounting for 67% of the total production. In this chain, charcoal
production is an off-season activity conducted mainly during the dry
season (5.6 ± 0.6 months; n = 170) as this coincides with a period
when agricultural labour demands are low. During interviews it was
also stated that when agricultural production is sufﬁcient to meet sub-
sistence demands of the household, such as after the harvest, they do
not produce charcoal. The leader of the village alone or in consultation
with the village committee decides where a household can produce.
On average, to each household a woodland area of 2.5 ± 1.2 ha was
allocated for a fee of 430 ± 98 MZN paid to the community guard
(ﬁscal ﬂorestal comunitário) (Table 3).
Of the local producers, 91% sell charcoal to wholesalers, whereas 9%
supply local markets directly, with selling prices varying between 250
and 300 MZN per sack. Most wholesalers come from urban areas and
usually own trucks, but others have to rent a truck and licence or trans-
port charcoalwith the train that passesMabalane once aweek. Estimat-
ing the number of wholesalers is difﬁcult, as anybody with good
relations to charcoal producers and connections to licence holders can
enter this business. Also, some of the former charcoal-producing
large-scale operators switched entirely to the wholesaler business
using their own licence to buy charcoal from different areas.Large-scale production and commercialisation by operators holding an
ofﬁcial licence
The second identiﬁed supply chain is composed predominantly of
urban-based men. In 2014, 156 people ofﬁcially held a production li-
cence for the district of Mabalane. Of these, 81% were non-residents
and 35% were female. The large-scale operators set up charcoal produc-
tion camps in the communities' woodlands and transport the charcoal
to urban markets in Maputo. There, charcoal can be sold for as much
as 900MZN per sack. In past, large-scale operators annually contributed
to the villages on the basis ofmaterials (e.g., constructionmaterials such
as cement or poles). This has changed recently tomonetary contribution
in the range of 25,000–30,000 MZN for an exploitation period of ﬁve
years. On average, 359 ± 169 ha of woodland was allocated to each
large-scale operator (Table 4).
The men working in the camps are 83% migrant workers from
Inhambane province, who work during the dry season (mainly March
to November) (Table 4). They are supplied with chainsaws and fuel as
well as with food and water by the owner of the camp (patrão). In
most cases their salary is paid in the formof fuelwithwhich theworkers
are allowed to produce their own charcoal in the same woodland area
and to sell it to wholesalers passing by, resulting in a 30–40% share in
total production. The following were identiﬁed as the main reasons for
the predominance of migrant workers in the charcoal production
camps: First, most migrant workers have better technical knowledge
on how to produce charcoal than the locals and second, they have
long-standing relations with their employers and tend to relocate
with them to new production frontiers, thus, mutual trust has been
established.Table 3
Main characteristics of the village production model.
Characteristic Mean ± SD
Woodland area distributed to each household (ha) 2.4 ± 1.2
Contribution paid to community guard for area
distribution (MZN)
430 ± 98
Annual household production (sacks yr−1)
1) Manual household labour only
2) Use of chainsaw and/or hired labour
124 ± 13 (SE)
77 ± 10.2
140 ± 16
SE: standard error. Data from focus group discussions and HH survey.Individual and association licencing
Individual licence holders do not always exploit their woodland
areas; instead they rent part of their licences to wholesalers who buy
charcoal from different communities. This is forbidden and subject to
heavy ﬁnes (20,000MZN): it leads to a discrepancy between the area li-
cenced and the actual exploitation area (GoM, 2002, Decree no. 12/
2002). Such discrepancy prevents the 20% revenue obtained from li-
cence fees from reaching the communities where charcoal has been ex-
tracted. It also negatively affects woodland exploitation monitoring. In
theory, law enforcement ofﬁcers (ﬁscais) from the SPFFB are regularly
controlling the exploitation areas of the licence holders and their adher-
ence to the management plan. In case of non-compliance, licences can
be withdrawn. However, monitoring and enforcement are weak, exac-
erbated by low staff numbers and the high number of licences. It is note-
worthy that regulation of the charcoal sector is further undermined by
its vulnerability to corruption. Even though local communities and law
enforcement ofﬁcers receive a compensation when identifying and
reporting illegalities (GoM, 2002, Decree no. 12/2002), bribing at check-
points along the charcoal transportation route seems to be routine. On
their way toMaputo-city, truck drivers (n=10) reported paying bribes
“refreshments” of 200–1500MZN to the ofﬁcers at the checkpoints (9 in
total). Overloading of trucks, non-conformity of exploitation area with
licenced area, non-stamping of the licences, and transportation without
licence can be bought at each checkpoint. According to these statements
“private taxes” can reach up to 8% of the retail price if no licence is used
at all. All these circumstances lead to the fact that only part of the char-
coal sold on urbanmarkets is produced in accordance to the Forest Law.
We estimate that 45% of the charcoal produced in the selected seven vil-
lages is licenced (calculation see S3). It should be noted that the licenced
volume probably exceeds the sustainable yield due to over optimistic
assumptions about tree growth rates.
Most local producers do not hold individual licences due to the bu-
reaucracy and the high cost of the licencing process. It was stated by
local people that they do not know how to apply for an individual li-
cence and that information about annual meetings at district level for
the distribution of the land to charcoal operators are notwell communi-
cated. Particularly because of recent changes in law (GoM, 2012, Decree
no. 30/2012) concerning the licence duration and management plans,
local people feel poorly informed about the legal situation.
Village producer associations, if in place, can help to legalise the
commercialisation of the charcoal produced by locals. Each association
can apply for a licence (1000 steres per year) and use it for the sale of
the members' charcoal. Those living more than two years in the com-
munity can become a member for a low entrance fee. The association
either sells the charcoal to wholesalers on the train or to clients with
trucks, charging a fee of 120 MZN per licenced sack on top of the
charcoal price of 250 MZN per sack. With this fee the licence costs
(75 MZN per sack) are covered and a gain of 45 MZN per sack remains
within the association for community projects (e.g., such as the bore-
hole in village E, describe above).
Fig. 3. Volume (steres) of licenced charcoal produced yearly in Mabalane, separated into licencing through associations and through individuals. 1 stere equals one sack.
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shows that over the last ﬁve years the charcoal volume licenced to asso-
ciations decreased by 90%, while the volume licenced to individual
operators did not change substantially. In the same timeframe, the
number of associations remained stable, whereas the number of
individual licences increased from 97 to 152. Focus group interviews re-
vealed the following factors as reasons for the reduced production by
associations: 1) the increasing number of large-scale operators facilitat-
ed the market access of the local producers, thus associations as
commercialisation channels were not needed; 2) the introduction of
the plano demaneio in 2012 increased the administrative burdens for li-
cence application; and 3) the increase of the licence price from 30MZN
to 75MZNper licenced stere in 2012 coincidedwithdecreasing charcoal
production rates in most villages, thus rendering the association's work
economically unviable. However, 4) in villageswith sufﬁcientwoodland
resources and high charcoal production, association work was severely
restricted through the ofﬁcial limitation of the licence volume per
association-nucleus to 1,000 steres per year, as stated by the umbrella
association situated in Combomune. In 2009 92,612 steres were com-
mercialised through this association, compared to 1000 steres in 2014.
This lower licence capacity does not sufﬁce for the commercialisation
of the community charcoal. Thus, most of the charcoal is sold to large-
scale operators or to wholesalers who rent licences from third parties.
Eventually, not only the revenue generated through association workFig. 4. Income generation for each actor group: A) Income margins per sack; B) Volume ois lost but also the revenue from 20% of the licence fee no longer reaches
the community whose resources were extracted.
Proﬁt distribution along the value chain
The highest margin per sack was generated by the large-scale oper-
ators (Fig. 4 A). This group can act as producer, transporter and whole-
saler. As such, they collect proﬁts at multiple levels. Wholesalers have
the second highest margin per sack. However, they earn the highest
monthly income: their traded charcoal volume is higher than that of
the other actors as they buy charcoal from different producers and use
multiple licences (Fig. 4B, C). For all charcoal traded without licence
the margin would increase by 16% for the large-scale operators and by
43% for the wholesalers. Local producers and migrant workers have
the lowest margin, volume and income.
Revenues at community level
Within the large-scale supply chain, most of the revenues arising
from charcoal production and commercialisation are transported out
of the communities: only 8% of the total revenues generated at the dis-
trict level remain with the villagers (Table 5). As the workers come, in
majority, from Inhambane and live in charcoal camps largely indepen-
dent from village economies, most salaries do not remain in the com-
munity where the wood is extracted. Theoretically, if the production isf monthly produced/traded charcoal; C) Average net income per month per person.
Table 5





MZN per sack MZN per sack
20% of licence fee 15 15
Fee collected by associations 45 –
Contribution to village by operator – 25
Revenues to community 60 40
Income margins of local operator 173 –







Community fund 12 8
Individual 33 –
Total 45 8
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and if the large-scale operators are contributing their share to the village
this equates to 40 MZN sack−1.
In contrast, the involvement of local producers in the value chain in-
creases local income (Table 5). When commercialisation of charcoal is
done through local associations, extra revenues stay in the village and
the percentage of the total annual revenues remaining increases to 45%.
In Table 6, the mean proportion of total annual income among the
main identiﬁed actors is exempliﬁed for three villages: one which al-
ready passed peak charcoal production, one with current high charcoal
production volumes, and one which has not yet reached high volumes
of production (see Table 2 for village characteristics). It becomes obvi-
ous that the proﬁt-boom experienced in the high production areas is
mainly produced and collected by the external agents. With very high
volumes they get the highest share of the produced proﬁts, theoretically
leading also to highest revenues to the community fund compared to
the pre-and post-boom-villages (1.9 m MZN for village E). However,
even though most of the villagers knew about the revenue from 20% li-
cence fee payment, in none of the villages visited could the people say
where the money is located or if any investment is planned, nor could
themonetary contribution of the large-scale operators to the communi-
ty be clearly stated. Moreover, only part of the produced charcoal is
licenced ofﬁcially.
Discussion
From the results the following key messages can be drawn: Under
the current value chain structure, a) incentivised by resource availabili-
ty and access, and little local regulations, the charcoal boom andTable 6
Total annual income distribution amongst themain actor groups of the value chain and revenue
Large-scale operator Who
Pre-boom village F
People engaged in production 0 2
Total annual charcoal prod. (thousand sacks) 0 4.6
Total annual income (million MZN) 0 1.3
Mean proportion of total annual income (%) 0 55
Boom village E
People engaged in production 22 9
Total annual charcoal prod. (thousand sacks) 28.0 21.3
Total annual income (million MZN) 13 5.9
Mean proportion of total annual income (%) 49 24
Post-boom village B
People engaged in production 1 1
Total annual charcoal prod. (thousand sacks) 1.0 2.7
Total annual income (million MZN) 0.5 0.7
Mean proportion of total annual income (%) 24 41
a The community fund consists of revenues collected through the 20% licence fee, the contributiowoodland exploitation is driven by large-scale operators integrated in
production, transportation andwholesaling and predominantly coming
from urban areas, b) most proﬁts generated through charcoal produc-
tion leave the communities, as is common in many value chains,
c) the bureaucratic licencing application process with high costs and
non-transparent procedures excludes local people from greater integra-
tion into charcoal commercialisation.
Despite this, communities beneﬁt from charcoal production: buyers
coming with trucks to the village open access to markets, charcoal pro-
duction offers an off-season activity, charcoal sale brings cash to the vil-
lage, migrant workers bring charcoaling skills, and large-scale operators
give monetary contributions in return for woodland use rights. Al-
though migrant workers are not contributing to the local economy
where the charcoal is produced, in the workers' home districts many
households are beneﬁting from their income. It can be argued that net
gains from charcoal production are likely to be negative if external
costs (such as opportunity costs of wood and labour) are internalised
and that the proﬁt is realised at the expense of other potential uses of
thewoodland (SEI, 2002; Luoga et al., 2000).While a link between char-
coal production and poverty alleviation has been shown elsewhere
(e.g., Schure et al., 2014a, 2014b; Zulu and Richardson, 2013; Arnold
et al., 2006), the question remains as to how communities canmaximise
their beneﬁts for better pro-poor charcoal production.
To answer this question, we examined our data through the access
approach lens proposed by Ribot and Peluso (2003) and Ribot (1998).
Access is deﬁned here as “ability to beneﬁt from things” (pg. 1 in Ribot
and Peluso, 2003) and high beneﬁts can be generated when a bundle
of access factors are fulﬁlled (Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Ribot, 1998).
Large-scale operators have such a “bundle of power” (pg. 1 in Ribot
and Peluso, 2003); they have access to woodlands, to transportation
means, to licences and to markets and they have the ability to maintain
their access. Access to capital clearly plays an important role to over-
come high barriers of entry adherent to the transportation business
and to buy commercialisation rights in form of licences and private
agreements. In contrast, although villagers have resource access, the
majority have little control over the access of others. They have nomar-
ket access either in the form of transportation, or in the form of
commercialisation rights. Large-scale operators and wholesalers open
the access to markets partly as they come to the villages with trucks
and licences. However, the negotiation power of local producers re-
mains very low. Ribot (1998) argues that access to markets might be
more important than control over woodland. Our case appears to dem-
onstrate this too. Access tomarkets through licences and transportation
means is a prerequisite for increasing the margin and turnover of local
charcoal production. On the other hand, local populations need to re-
gain control over woodland access in order to prevent their woodremaining in the community in exemplar pre-boom, boomand post-boomvillages in 2013.













ns from large-scale operators and the fees collected by associations (Table 5).
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exhausted.
The Lawon Forest andWildlife (GoM, 1999) sets standards for a sus-
tainable and equitable charcoal sector but, as revealed by this study,
there are several limitations: 1) commercialisation rights can be
attained in the form of licences, however, licences can only be received
after a bureaucratic process including the preparation of a forest man-
agement plan (see also Zulu, 2010; Nhancale et al., 2009). Communities
are unlikely to be able to fulﬁll all requirements as knowledge and infor-
mation are lacking at the local level. Thus, licencing systems effectively
exclude rural communities from legal resource commercialisation
(e.g., Minten et al., 2013; Ribot, 1993). 2) Local communities are encour-
aged to co-manage their woodland resources through the formation of
community management committees (Comités de Gestão Comunitária),
but weak institutional capacities at the local level render community-
management programmes for sustainable production and the manage-
ment of generated community funds difﬁcult (Brouwer, 2008). 3) Ac-
cording to the law, villagers have the right to control the woodland
exploitation on their community land, as any decision about the inten-
sity of charcoal production within a community (number of licence
holders and large-scale operators) has to be taken at district level
under community consultation. However, in reality, most villagers do
not have any clarity about the charcoal exploitation system and about
community rights, but state that ﬁnal decisions are usually made by
the village head and the district governor as “the forest does not belong
to the community but to the state” (ref FGD). Ribot (1998) also ob-
served that village leaders often accept large-scale operators even if
the village population has objections, either because of the beneﬁts
they might gain or because of pressure. 4) Greater participation of the
communities in local woodland governance is targeted through the em-
ployment of community guards (ﬁscais ﬂorestais comunitários) control-
ling the woodland exploitation along with the forest ofﬁcers. However,
community guards did state that they do not have themeans to control
woodland exploitation due to limited equipment (mobility and com-
munications). Moreover, lacking effectiveness of monetary incentives
(i.e., 50% share of ﬁnes with law enforcement ofﬁcers), social pressure
from community members and susceptibility to bribes undermine the
effectiveness of these guards (Brouwer, 2008). Particularly in remote
areas, personal relationships and informal rules matter more than for-
mal laws (Pereira and Joaquim, 2002; SEI, 2002).
As Nhancale et al. (2009) stated, the current situation clearly re-
wards those who contribute little to local development and sustainabil-
ity. Thus, the charcoal sector has become dominated by urban operators
who exploit large-scale community woodland resources, facilitated by
constantly increasing urban demand and easy access. The market
operates as monopsony in which many local producers are confronted
with a limited number of large-scale operators placing them at a disad-
vantageous position in terms of price setting andwoodland governance.
Communities without functional associations are likely to lose more.
Altogether, it is clear that charcoal production in Mabalane district
lacks strong local institutions that govern the use of resources and asso-
ciated monetary revenues. Already Brouwer and Magane (1999) called
for the restriction of woodland access to non-residents through the
reinforcement of the local population's power of control. Access to
commercial rights by woodland dependent communities has to be im-
proved and the business capacity of the communities has to be strength-
ened (Nhancale et al., 2009; Schreckenberg and Luttrell, 2009).
Moreover, community participation in ﬁeld monitoring and Forest
Law enforcement, e.g., monitoring the investment of the 20% licence
fee, has to be an integral development and should be supported (del
Gatto, 2003). Here, associations play an important role in channelling
the trade of the village charcoal producers, reducing costs and increas-
ing political and market bargaining power (Macqueen et al., 2006).
Associations can give structure to the currently largely informal sector
and help local people to sustainably earn from their woodlands
(Macqueen et al., 2006).Notwithstanding, the legal framework appears to be a key barrier to
legal resource commercialisation by local communities. It may be that
this barrier could be overcome with stronger local institutions and a
“public service” rather than a “regulation” approach to woodland re-
sources, viewing themprimarily as resource for rural development rath-
er than an environmental problem (Dewees et al., 2010). Within the
bounds of the current approach, several adjustments to the legal frame-
work could be made that would reduce the burden on small-scale pro-
ducers and the need for capacity building. These include a) reducing
costs and administrative procedures for local small-scale producers;
b) increasing the licence volume for local associations; c) increasing
transparency of the licencing and commercialisation process.
Conclusion
Our value chain analysis makes clear that most of the proﬁts are
generated by large-scale operators andwholesalers, while little revenue
remains in the communities whose woodland resources are exploited.
Difﬁculties in receiving commercialisation rights to communities hinder
their value chain integration and reduce their proﬁt generation from
charcoal production. Despite their de facto rights of control over their
woodlands, the communities do not have the ability to govern their
resources due to weak institutional capacities.
We highlight the necessity of interventions targeted at the redistri-
bution of total proﬁts along the value chain and the transfer of wood-
land governance to the local communities. The following measures are
key:
- Development of strong local institutions for charcoal commer-
cialisation and woodland management;
- Information and extension services provision to villages, district and
central government actors about their rights, responsibilities, obliga-
tions, and management options (e.g., more efﬁcient conversion of
wood to charcoal) regarding charcoal production, trade and use;
- Adjustment of the legal framework to make it easier for small-scale
charcoal producers to participate in the trade legally;
- Rigorous enforcement of regulations along the value chain (exploita-
tion areas, transportation routes) and transparency of its monitoring.
It remains to be analysed how revenues created at village level are
distributed horizontally and to what extent the villagers beneﬁt equita-
bly. Investment of the charcoal revenue in productive assets is key if
charcoal is going to be a route out of rural poverty.
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